Photo 1 sur 1
Galerie
Photo 1 sur 1
Vous en avez un à vendre?
L'ironie du Vietnam : le système fonctionné par Leslie H. Gelb (anglais) Paperback Bo
51,35 $US
Environ70,59 $C
État :
Entièrement neuf
Un livre neuf, non lu, non utilisé et en parfait état, sans aucune page manquante ni endommagée.
3 disponibles
- Achat immédiatL'ironie du Vietnam : le système fonctionné par Leslie H. Gelb (anglais) Paperback Bo
Oops! Looks like we're having trouble connecting to our server.
Refresh your browser window to try again.
Expédition :
Sans frais Economy Shipping.
Lieu : Fairfield, Ohio, États-Unis
Livraison :
Livraison prévue entre le mar. 12 août et le lun. 18 août à 94104
Renvois :
Renvoi sous 30 jours. L'acheteur paie les frais de renvoi. Si vous utilisez une étiquette d'envoi eBay, son coût sera déduit du montant de votre remboursement.
Paiements :
Magasinez en toute confiance
Le vendeur assume l'entière responsabilité de cette annonce.
Numéro de l'objet eBay :388585572252
Dernière mise à jour : juil. 27, 2025 18:52:29 HAEAfficher toutes les modificationsAfficher toutes les modifications
Caractéristiques de l'objet
- État
- ISBN-13
- 9780815730712
- Book Title
- The Irony of Vietnam
- ISBN
- 9780815730712
À propos de ce produit
Product Identifiers
Publisher
Brookings Institution Press
ISBN-10
0815730713
ISBN-13
9780815730712
eBay Product ID (ePID)
569817
Product Key Features
Number of Pages
400 Pages
Language
English
Publication Name
Irony of Vietnam : the System Worked
Publication Year
1979
Subject
Military / Vietnam War, World / Asian, International Relations / Diplomacy
Type
Textbook
Subject Area
Political Science, History
Format
Trade Paperback
Dimensions
Item Height
0.9 in
Item Weight
20.7 Oz
Item Length
9 in
Item Width
6 in
Additional Product Features
Intended Audience
Scholarly & Professional
LCCN
78-026563
Dewey Edition
23
TitleLeading
The
Dewey Decimal
327.73/0597
Synopsis
Argues that although U.S. foreign policy failed with regard to the Vietnam War, the decision making processes worked., " Few analysts of U.S. involvement in Vietnam would agree with the provocative conclusion of this book. The thesis of most postmortems is that the United States lost the war because of the failure of its foreign policy decisionmaking system. According to Gelb and Betts, however, the foreign policy failed, but the decisionmaking system worked. They attribute this paradox to the efficiency of the system in sustaining an increasingly heavy commitment based on the shared conviction of six administrations that the United States must prevent the loss of Vietnam to communism. However questionable the conviction, and thus the commitment, may have been, the authors stress that the latter ""was made and kept for twenty-five years. That is what the system--the shared values, the political and bureaucratic pressures--was designed to do, and it did it."" The comprehensive analysis that supports this contention reflects the widest use thus fare of available sources, including recently declassified portions of negotiations documents and files in presidential libraries. The frequently quoted statement of the principals themselves contradict the commonly held view that U.S. leaders were unaware of the consequences of their decisions and deluded by false expectations of easy victory. With few exceptions, the record reveals that these leaders were both realistic and pessimistic about the chances for success in Vietnam. Whey they persisted nonetheless is explained in this thorough account of their decisionmaking from 1946 to 1968, and how their mistakes might be avoided by policymakers in the future is considered in the final chapter. ", Few analysts of U.S. involvement in Vietnam would agree with the provocative conclusion of this book. The thesis of most postmortems is that the United States lost the war because of the failure of its foreign policy decisionmaking system. According to Gelb and Betts, however, the foreign policy failed, but the decisionmaking system worked. They attribute this paradox to the efficiency of the system in sustaining an increasingly heavy commitment based on the shared conviction of six administrations that the United States must prevent the loss of Vietnam to communism. However questionable the conviction, and thus the commitment, may have been, the authors stress that the latter "was made and kept for twenty-five years. That is what the system -the shared values, the political and bureaucratic pressures -was designed to do, and it did it." The comprehensive analysis that supports this contention reflects the widest use thus fare of available sources, including recently declassified portions of negotiations documents and files in presidential libraries. The frequently quoted statement of the principals themselves contradict the commonly held view that U.S. leaders were unaware of the consequences of their decisions and deluded by false expectations of easy victory. With few exceptions, the record reveals that these leaders were both realistic and pessimistic about the chances for success in Vietnam. Whey they persisted nonetheless is explained in this thorough account of their decisionmaking from 1946 to 1968, and how their mistakes might be avoided by policymakers in the future is considered in the final chapter., Few analysts of U.S. involvement in Vietnam would agree with the provocative conclusion of this book. The thesis of most postmortems is that the United States lost the war because of the failure of its foreign policy decisionmaking system. According to Gelb and Betts, however, the foreign policy failed, but the decisionmaking system worked. They attribute this paradox to the efficiency of the system in sustaining an increasingly heavy commitment based on the shared conviction of six administrations that the United States must prevent the loss of Vietnam to communism. However questionable the conviction, and thus the commitment, may have been, the authors stress that the latter ""was made and kept for twenty-five years. That is what the system--the shared values, the political and bureaucratic pressures--was designed to do, and it did it."" The comprehensive analysis that supports this contention reflects the widest use thus fare of available sources, including recently declassified portions of negotiations documents and files in presidential libraries. The frequently quoted statement of the principals themselves contradict the commonly held view that U.S. leaders were unaware of the consequences of their decisions and deluded by false expectations of easy victory. With few exceptions, the record reveals that these leaders were both realistic and pessimistic about the chances for success in Vietnam. Whey they persisted nonetheless is explained in this thorough account of their decisionmaking from 1946 to 1968, and how their mistakes might be avoided by policymakers in the future is considered in the final chapter.
As told to
Betts, Richard K.
Description de l'objet du vendeur
Évaluations comme vendeur (1 055 011)
- w***i (874)- Évaluation laissée par l'acheteur.Dernier moisAchat vérifiéAbsolutely Wonderful Seller!! Terrific Item As Described!!! Great Service and Communication!! Shipped In Waterproof Packaging!! I Received Item In About One Week!! Very Pleased With Seller! I Will Buy From This Seller Again!!
- e***_ (17)- Évaluation laissée par l'acheteur.Six derniers moisAchat vérifiéSeller handles a massive inventory so I give them grace on the slow processing and shipping. They were very communicative and prompt with their response when I messaged in asking about it. Book was in good condition as described. Small ding on the page edges which wasn't mentioned, but that's fairly common even at your typical book store. Still a good value and I'd buy from them again.
- 0***i (5)- Évaluation laissée par l'acheteur.Six derniers moisAchat vérifiéThe first item arrived with some damage to the inside back cover, but the seller responded immediately, assuring me they’d provide a replacement, and even told me I could keep the original. They were upfront about a short delay, and gave a clear estimated ship date, and followed up right on time once it shipped. The replacement arrived in perfect condition and exactly as described. I really appreciated their transparency and professionalism. Would definitely buy from them again!
Évaluations comme vendeur (1 055 011)
- w***i (874)- Évaluation laissée par l'acheteur.Dernier moisAchat vérifiéAbsolutely Wonderful Seller!! Terrific Item As Described!!! Great Service and Communication!! Shipped In Waterproof Packaging!! I Received Item In About One Week!! Very Pleased With Seller! I Will Buy From This Seller Again!!
- e***_ (17)- Évaluation laissée par l'acheteur.Six derniers moisAchat vérifiéSeller handles a massive inventory so I give them grace on the slow processing and shipping. They were very communicative and prompt with their response when I messaged in asking about it. Book was in good condition as described. Small ding on the page edges which wasn't mentioned, but that's fairly common even at your typical book store. Still a good value and I'd buy from them again.
- 0***i (5)- Évaluation laissée par l'acheteur.Six derniers moisAchat vérifiéThe first item arrived with some damage to the inside back cover, but the seller responded immediately, assuring me they’d provide a replacement, and even told me I could keep the original. They were upfront about a short delay, and gave a clear estimated ship date, and followed up right on time once it shipped. The replacement arrived in perfect condition and exactly as described. I really appreciated their transparency and professionalism. Would definitely buy from them again!